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IN OBAMACARE CONTINUED:  
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STATES, LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, ET AL.   
BY: JOHN DOROCAK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Faculty, students, administrators, guests, distinguished fellow 
speakers.  
I have been asked to address the future of Obamacare in light of my 
past scholarship involving NFIB v. Sebelius.1 
In the presence of my fellow very distinguished speakers and this 
audience, I feel, as I often do, to be something of an interloper. I am merely 
the tax professor trying to understand how Obamacare was ever 
constitutional. The fact that this presentation was not much altered by the 
events concerning the ACA and AHCA likely speaks either to the 
timelessness or irrelevance of the topic. I prefer to believe it is the former. 
Now retired Professor Erik Jensen, of my J.D. alma mater, Case 
Western Reserve University, has said, in an article Critical Theory and the 
Loneliness of the Tax Prof, “[T]he issues of race, gender, and class have not 
been addressed very much by tax professors, who have instead ‘focused on 
more narrow and technical issues in business and financial taxation.’”2 
                                                 
 
 
1 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
* John R. Dorocak, Honors A.B., Xavier University, J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 
LL.M. (Tax), University of  Florida, C.P.A., California and Ohio, is a Professor of Accounting at 
California State University, San Bernardino. Thank you to my wife, Tanya, who constantly 
inspires me, our new dog Indy, who has taken on the task from the sadly deceased and not 
forgotten Murphy to constantly entertain me, and to our sons Jonathan and Garrett, who 
constantly interest me. Thank you also to Kathi Menard who has taken on the task, from the now 
retired Marion Wiltjer, of trying to decipher my dictation and handwriting. In addition, I would 
like to thank participants at the Pacific Southwest Region Academy of Legal Studies in Business 
Annual Meetings for their insightful comments and questions concerning this and other 
publications of mine.   
 
2 Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76 N.C.L. Rev. 1753, 1756, 
& n.17 and accompanying text (1998) (citing Edward McCaffery, Statement at Taxation and the 
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Professor Jensen has also stated, “But raise one tax question with a conlaw 
person and he’s gone. . . .”3 
Still, tax practitioners and tax academicians were forced to deal with 
Obamacare as it was first determined to be constitutional as a tax and 
subsequently implemented as a tax.  
Many may have had a visceral reaction; how can the government 
force us to purchase medical insurance? What is next? Eating broccoli as 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius, seemingly 
holding the Commerce Clause could not sustain a federal mandate on 
individuals to purchase health insurance?4 Or purchasing life insurance, as I 
have sometimes not so facetiously suggested?  
Professor Randy Barnett of Georgetown Law School, has suggested, 
as I understand, that professors have missed the fact that individuals are not 
forced to buy health insurance, but rather to pay a tax if they do not choose 
to purchase health insurance.5 Many tax professors might say, what’s the 
difference? Professor Barnett was arguing for the no small feat of the anti-
Obamacare litigants at the Supreme Court in NFIB prevailing on the 
argument that Obamacare could not be sustained as an extension of the 
Commerce Clause.6  
In any event, what constitutional arguments are available against 
Obamacare to support what I have suggested as the initial constitutional gut 
reaction? My first foray into examining the constitutionality of Obamacare 
may have been more unique–that liberty was the constitutional right violated 
by Obamacare. When I first wrote in New Hampshire Law Review in 2013, 
I drew upon Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, and the 
precursors–particularly Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut (“The right to be let alone” protected by, of all things, the Ninth 
Amendment) and the language, which some have attributed to Justice 
Kennedy in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
(“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).7  
                                                 
 
 
Family Conference at Lewis & Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995), quoted in 
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Taxation and the Family, 69 Tax Notes 421, 421 (1995)).  
3 Id. at 1753. 
4 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012).  
5 Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law 
Professors Miss the Boat)? 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1331, 1337-38 (2013).  
6 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
7 John R. Dorocak, Tax Constitutional Questions in “Obamacare”: National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius in Light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and 
Speiser v. Randall: Conditioning a Tax Benefit on the Nonexercise of a Constitutional Right, 11 
U. N.H. L. Rev. 189, 200–208 (2013) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).  
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Subsequent to my publication in New Hampshire’s Law Review, 
Justice Kennedy, of course, wrote the majority opinion in United States v. 
Windsor revisiting his analysis, ten years after, from Lawrence v. Texas.8 
Next, I wrote of Justice Kennedy’s analysis on the unconstitutionality of 
DOMA (The Defense of Marriage Act) in GMU Civil Rights Law Journal.9 
Thirdly, I asked in Connecticut Public Interest Law Review, Why is 
Obamacare constitutional while DOMA was not?10 Certainly, there are other 
arguments that legislation such as, and similar to, Obamacare is 
unconstitutional. Some have written, as mentioned, of the exceptional 
campaign mounted, and the success at the U.S. Supreme Court, in arguing 
that Obamacare could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause. Others 
have raised additional arguments, which I attempted to summarize in the 
Connecticut article, against the constitutionality of Obamacare, including the 
following: 
1. the aforementioned lack of Commerce Clause support; 
2. the Origination Clause (that Obamacare legislation 
originated in the Senate essentially rather than, as required by the 
Constitution, in the House);  
3. the Uniformity Clause (that Obamacare, if it is a tax, is not 
uniform throughout the United States, as required by the Constitution);  
4. the direct tax clause (that Obamacare was in violation of the 
Constitutional prohibition on direct taxes unless apportioned among the 
states); and  
5. the lack of an Enumerated Power for the federal government 
to enact such a program.6. The fact that, despite Chief Justice Roberts’ 
majority opinion in NFIB, the Obamacare tax is not a tax, at least not a tax 
seen before.11  
The focus of my comments today will be how legislation, such as 
Obamacare, violates liberty or liberty rights conferred by the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
 
 
8 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-2694 (2013) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003)).   
9 John R. Dorocak, Is the Constitution Only Libertarian and Not Socially Conservative? U.S. v. 
Windsor and the Constitutionality of DOMA’s Definition of Marriage to Exclude Same-Sex 
Couples–Requiem for a Heavyweight? 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 263 (2014).  
10 John R. Dorocak, Why is Obamacare Constitutional While DOMA Was Not? How Libertarian 
is the Constitution?, 14 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 1 (2014). 
11 Id. at 22-27; Maximilian Held, Go Forth and Sin [Tax] No More: Important Tax Provisions, 
and Their Hazards, in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 717, 
731-732 (2011) (cited in Timothy Sandefur, So It’s a Tax, Now What?: Some of the Problems 
Remaining after NFIB v. Sebelius, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 203, n.145 (2013) (“attempting to 
catalogue the PPACA tax and concluding that ‘such an anomalous example of taxation cannot be 
found in any Supreme Court decision.’”)). See also Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Taxing Power 
After Sebelius, 5 Wake F. L. Rev. 941 (2016). 
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PART I.  CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC AND SPEISER V. RANDALL–
CONDITIONING A (TAX) BENEFIT ON THE NONEXERCISE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
 
In Citizens United v. FEC, not only did Justice Kennedy decide that 
corporations and labor unions had First Amendment Free Speech rights, thus 
laying the foundation for super PACs, he also employed, some might say 
resuscitated, the Constitutional Conditions Doctrine.12 That doctrine states 
that a benefit, including a tax benefit, cannot be conditioned on the non-
exercise of a constitutional right.13 Justice Stewart stated in Perry v. 
Sinderman that allowing a benefit to be conditioned on the nonexercise of a 
constitutional right “would allow the government to ‘produce a result which 
[it] could not command directly.’”14 
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy stated that the benefit of the 
corporate form of organization could not be conditioned on a corporation’s 
forfeiting its First Amendment Free Speech right to speak in political 
elections by making unlimited third-party expenditures, but not unlimited 
contributions, to candidates.15 Justice Kennedy cited to Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in another case, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, but stopped 
literally just short of citing Justice Scalia’s citation to another case, Speiser 
v. Randall.16 
In Speiser v. Randall, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California 
property tax exemption could not be conditioned on a veteran’s requirement 
to swear a loyalty oath, when the oath would violate free speech.17 Yes, 
taxation again involved in an important constitutional case. I had familiarity 
in my research with Speiser and Citizens United because of another article, 
which Professor Lloyd Peake and I had published in North Carolina First 
Amendment Law Review, on the political activities of tax-exempt churches 
in light of Citizens United.18 
                                                 
 
 
12 558 U.S. 310 (2010); See, e.g., Dorocak, supra note 5, at n.49–50 and accompanying text; 
Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Engagement with the Affordable Care Act: Why Rationale Basis 
Analysis Falls Short, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 931, 933–34 (2012) (lamenting the decline of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Samuel C. Salganik, Note, What the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine Can Teach Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently 
Identify “Coercive” Pay-or-Play Schemes?, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1482 (2009) (citing much of the 
existing scholarship). 
13 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)). 
14 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).  
15 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010). 
16 Id. at 346. 
17 357 U.S. 513 (1958).  
18 John R. Dorocak, Lloyd E. Peake, Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Churches, Particularly After 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and California’s Proposition 8 Ban On Same-Sex 
Marriage: Render Under Caesar What is Caesar’s, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 448 (2011).  
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In attempting an argument that Obamacare was unconstitutional, I 
was interested in using Speiser v. Randall and Citizens United.19 The question 
that arises, despite a possible gut reaction of unconstitutionality is, upon the 
non-exercise of what constitutional right would the benefit of no Obamacare 
tax be conditioned?20 In a eureka or aha! moment, it occurred to me that 
liberty might be that constitutional right.21 I had approached the 
constitutional condition analysis, I believe, as a traditional scholar, not an 
ideologue, as may be obvious from my movement from the Free Speech 
article on Citizens United.22 True, I had vague awareness as a tax professor 
that some scholars were fashioning arguments based on liberty or liberty 
rights found in the Constitution, or even in the Declaration of 
Independence,23 from such various sources as the Preamble,24 the Ninth 
Amendment,25 the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteen 
Amendments,26 and the Equal Protection Clause.27 Although Justice Scalia, 
in his dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius, mentioned private conduct, he relied more 
explicitly on the list of the enumerated powers of the federal government and 
the reservation of power to the states by the Tenth Amendment.28 What may 
                                                 
 
 
19 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
20 Dorocak, supra note 7, at nn.60-67 and accompanying text.  
21 Id. at nn.63—67 and accompanying text.  
22 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
23 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]hat all men . . . are endowed, by their 
Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness . . . .”). 
24 U.S. Const. Pmbl. ([S]ecure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and Posterity . . . .”).  
25 U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
26 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (Justice Kennedy writing for the 
majority states “[C]ongress . . . cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividual decisions . . . 
concerning intimacies of their physical relationship . . . are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
27 Randy E. Barnett, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: The Presumption of 
Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental Rights, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & 
Pol’y. 29, 31 (2006) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against denying any person the equal protection of the laws . . . . 
[T]he equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment right all the 
more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”).  
28 567 U.S. 519, 647, 655 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789 Constitution, by the 
Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and by innumerable cases of hours in the 
220 years since, is that there are structural limits upon federal power–upon 
what it can prescribe with respect to private conduct, and upon what it can 
impose upon the sovereign States. Whatever may be the conceptual limits of 
the Commerce Clause and upon the power to tax and spend, they cannot be as 
such will enable the Federal Government to regulate all private conduct and 
to compel the State’s to function as administrators of federal programs.  
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have informed my insight concerning liberty as the burdened constitutional 
right, as I documented in the New Hampshire Law Review, was an overnight 
Revolutionary War re-enactment outing I attended at the insistence of my 
then fifth-grade son. In Southern California at an establishment named 
Riley’s Farm, the evening meal was held in a Revolutionary War era pub and 
featured the patriarch of the family farm delivering, as Patrick Henry, the 
famous “Give me liberty or give me death” speech.29 
 
PART II.  LIBERTY AND SUPREME COURT CASES – LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY, 
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, AND OBERGEFELL 
V. HODGES 
 
Are there Supreme Court cases offering precedents for the finding of 
such liberty or liberty rights? Even before United States v. Windsor, when 
Justice Kennedy’s revisited his analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, there was 
Lawrence, and particularly Griswold v. Connecticut and Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, all of which offered language and 
analysis which might be used to find liberty or a liberty right could not be 
violated.30  
(1)  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held 
a Texas statute, prohibiting same-sex, sodomy unconstitutional because it 
                                                 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
The Government was invited, at oral argument, to suggest what federal 
controls over private conduct (other than those explicitly prohibited by the Bill 
of Rights or other constitutional controls) could not be justified as necessary 
and proper for carrying out a general regulatory scheme. It was unable to name 
any. . . . 
; U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).;  
Dorocak, supra, note 7, at n.67 and accompanying text. (citing Brad Joondeph, et al., Our Pending 
National Debate: Is Healthcare Reform Constitutional?, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 605, 617 (2011) 
(Professor Randy Barnett had suggested that the limited powers argument could more easily find a 
receptive audience, particularly on the Court, stating, “I think there may be five votes for the 
proposition that economic mandates are simply not within the limited and enumerated powers of 
Congress.”).  
29 See, id. at n. 113 and accompanying text. Riley’s Farm in Oak Glen, California, 
www.rileysfarm.com. See, William Wirt Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry 94 
(1817) (quoting Patrick Henry, Speech at the House of Burgesses at St. John’s Church in 
Richmond, Virginia (Mar. 23, 1775) (transcript available at 
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Patrick_Henry)).  
30 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
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violated liberty.31 Justice Kennedy quoted from Justice Stevens’s dissent in 
the predecessor case, Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a similar 
statute.32 Justice Stevens stated in part, “[I]ndividual decisions . . . concerning 
the intimacies of their physical relationship . . . are a form of ‘liberty’ 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”33 
Justice Kennedy also wrote in his introductory language in Lawrence, 
“Liberty protects a person from unwarranted government intrusion . . . liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self . . . The instant case involves liberty . . . .”34  
(2) Justice Kennedy also quoted from Casey in Lawrence, 
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”35  
Certainly, medical and medical insurance decisions, including 
whether to purchase medical insurance or not, are among these most intimate 
personal choices central to liberty.  
Professor Barnett has written of Casey “[I]n a portion of the joint 
opinion commonly attributed to Justice Kennedy, the Court shifted the focus 
from privacy to liberty and even relied on the Ninth Amendment to do so.”36 
It appears that Professor Barnett is concluding that there is reliance on the 
Ninth Amendment, which he has favored in his research,37 although Casey 
apparently only obliquely refers to that amendment in the opinion of the 
Court.”38  
(3)  On the other hand, in Griswold v. Connecticut, in his 
concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg cited the Ninth Amendment, and wrote, 
quoting Justice Brandeis, “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred as 
                                                 
 
 
31 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
32 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
34 Id. at 562.  
35 Id. at 574 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).  
36 Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1479, 1493 (2008) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 848; and Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 20, 2007 (identifying the discussion of liberty in Casey as the “portion of the opinion usually 
attributed to Justice Kennedy”)).  
37 Barnett, supra note 27, at 31.  
Still, I started writing about the Ninth Amendment because it always seemed 
like an interesting clause, and one that appealed to me ever since I was a law 
student. I figured, “well, now I had tenure, so I should be able to write about 
any clause that was still literally in the Constitution, even if it was considered 
to be beyond the pale by scholars.” 
38 505 U.S. at 847. 
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against the government, the right to be let alone–the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized Man.”39 
(4) In United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
two Supreme Court cases involving same-sex marriage, Justice Kennedy 
appears to have continued his liberty or liberty rights analysis.40 This 
analysis, it seems, might also be utilized to argue that Obamacare and similar 
legislation is unconstitutional. 
(a) In Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority 
holding unconstitutional DOMA’s definition of marriage as between a man 
and a woman, stated as follows. 
 The power which the Constitution grants it 
also restrains. And though Congress has great 
authority to design laws to fit its own conception of 
sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.41 
 
Writing midway between Lawrence and Windsor, Professor Barnett 
argued that a new analysis had emerged, distinct from the traditional due 
process and equal protection analyses, both raised by Justice Alito in his 
Windsor dissent. 
In other words, Lawrence did not purport to 
assess the degree to which the statutory prohibition 
might have met a legitimate state purpose. Instead, 
it rejected an open-ended conception of the police 
power of the states and found that the particular 
purpose of the statute was illegitimate or improper. 
This is analogous to finding a federal statute 
unconstitutional because, however effective it might 
be, its purpose is not among the enumerated powers 
in Article I, Section 8.42  
 
I thought Windsor spoke most clearly to the unconstitutionality of 
Obamacare just as the Windsor same-sex couple could not be forced 
to marry opposite gender partners to enjoy the estate tax marital 
deduction, I believe that individuals should not be forced to purchase 
health insurance to avoid a tax. 
                                                 
 
 
39 381 U.S. 479, 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
40 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
41 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.  
42 Barnett, supra note 36, at 1495.  
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(b) Subsequently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, again writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy held state prohibitions on same-sex marriages 
unconstitutional. 
The Constitution promises liberty to all 
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain 
specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful 
realm, to define and express their identity. The 
petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by 
marrying someone of the same sex. 
   
  . . . .  
 
These considerations lead to the conclusion 
that the right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex 
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.43 
 
(5)  In my most recent manuscript, to be published in the 
Willamette Law Review, I argue that an attempt to revoke tax exempt status 
of churches opposed to same-sex marriage could be resisted by the churches, 
if the IRS ever raised such a challenge and in light of private parties likely 
lacking standing.44 The churches could argue the First Amendment Free 
Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and liberty rights.45 
I ask, why not liberty for all?  
(6) Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (as well as possibly 
other cases) likely shows that Obamacare might be challenged for 
constitutional violations, although Hobby Lobby is based on the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act rather than the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause.46  
 
PART III.  TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
OF OBAMACARE 
                                                 
 
 
43 135 S. Ct. at 2593, 2604.   
44 John R. Dorocak, How Might a Church’s Tax-Exempt Status (and Other Advantages) (1) Be 
Revoked Procedurally for Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage and (2) Be Defended Possibly as 
Free Exercise of Religion? , 53 Willamette L. Rev., No. 2 (forthcoming).  
45 Id. 
46 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
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In this forum at this time, I do not believe that I can do justice to 
traditional due process and equal protection analysis, with which many are 
undoubtedly familiar. However, there is an aspect of substantive due process 
to which it might be illuminating to give some attention. Professor Randy 
Barnett has criticized traditional due process and equal protection analysis.47 
Yet, Mr. Timothy Sandefur has defended substantive due process by 
returning to its possible origin in the Supreme Court case of Calder v. Bull.48  
Mr. Daniel J. Crooks, III, has written, “[W]indsor is best understood 
as a Lawrence-brand “liberty” case distinct from the Court’s traditional equal 
protection and due process precedents.”49 Mr. Crooks has also written, “The 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence is esoteric and yet equally 
incomprehensible to even the keenest minds in the legal academy.”50 
As I review in my article in Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, 
Justice Alito dissenting in Windsor summarized the traditional jurisprudence 
of substantive due process and equal protection and the three tiers of scrutiny 
of equal protection (and possibly the two tiers of scrutiny of substantive due 
process).51 
Mr. Timothy Sandefur has argued, based at least partly on Calder v. 
Bull, concerning substantive due process, “[T]he Constitution imposes 
implicit limits on the laws the legislature can enact, and the content of those 
limits can be understood only by considering what the Constitution was 
written to accomplish and what government may not justly do . . . .”52 Mr. 
Sandefur quotes from Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull, “There are 
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will 
determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power 
. . . to take away that security for personal liberty . . . for the protection 
whereof the government was established.”53 
Mr. Sandefur has written elsewhere, when describing the contrast 
between liberal and conservative originalists, “Understanding the 
Constitution requires reference to more permanent principles than mere long-
standing social convention.”54 
                                                 
 
 
47 Barnett, supra note 36. 
48 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the 
Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y., 283 (2012).  
49 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); 
Daniel J. Crooks, III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Process and 
Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 
8 Charleston L. Rev. 223, 226 (2014). 
50 Crooks, supra note 49, at 229. 
51 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Dorocak, supra note 10, at 14.  
52 Sandefur, supra note 48, at 321.  
53 Id. at 321 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)).  
54 Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y. 
489, 497 (2004).  
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The reference to more permanent principles by Mr. Sandefur, and 
not tradition, may echo for some, what Professor Randy Barnett has called a 
difference between original meaning and original intent, respectively.55 
Professor Barnett has written elsewhere, “Lawrence did not purport to assess 
the degree to which the statutory prohibition might have met a legitimate 
state purpose. . . . This is analogous to finding a federal statute 
unconstitutional because, however effective it might be, its purpose is not 
among the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8.”56 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When I began this journey in the summer of 2012, trying to 
understand the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed by Obamacare, 
I did not really know where my inquiry might lead. As others in the tax field, 
I began with the thought in mind that the supposed “tax” imposed by 
Obamacare did not look like other taxes.57 Mainly from a tax perspective, I 
thought that the Supreme Court would hold Obamacare unconstitutional on 
some ground. Then, I thought Governor Romney might deny President 
Obama a second term and the implementation of Obamacare.  
Justice Scalia said in the dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius: (1) that the 
federal government could provide a tax credit for purchasing health insurance 
but not a tax for not purchasing such insurance and (2) that, if Justice 
Ginsberg were correct, the federal government was a government of 
problem-solving powers not limited or enumerated powers.58 Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote in the majority opinion that, yes, the federal government could 
impose a tax for failure to install energy-efficient windows.59 
With Republicans on their way to repeal and replace Obamacare with 
apparently little concern for a constitutional basis for national healthcare, this 
may be one of a few lone voices in the wilderness. Still, Republicans’ initial 
repeal and replacement of Obamacare, The American Health Care Act, does 
offer essentially the repeal of the individual mandate, by removing the tax 
for failure to purchase health insurance, and a premium surcharge on an 
individual for entering the health insurance market later (presumably when 
more in need of health insurance).60 The latter is a feature Justice Scalia 
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echoed in his NFIB dissent.61 The thought is that the Founders would have 
believed that Justice Scalia in this instance was closer to their original 
meaning.62 We’ll leave the discussion of original meaning and original intent 
to others for now and until other days.63 
Thank you for your attention and this opportunity to present my 
views. Of course, the issue here is broader than the Obamacare context. 
Essentially, there is the conundrum posed by Benjamin Franklin, do U.S. 
citizens want big government’s promise of security or do they want liberty?64 
NFIB does not exist in a vacuum.65 In the same time frame it was being 
decided, the Supreme Court also decided Citizens United, Windsor, 
Obergefell, and other cases.66 I have come to believe that it can be argued 
Obamacare and DOMA could make ordinary pragmatic Americans more 
self-conscious of liberty, if we could only move past the security issue, and 
thus, I have been attempting to reach a wider audience with this message.67  
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss a topic, liberty, which has 
become quite dear to me lately and maybe not surprisingly.  
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